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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey period, I Illinois courts faced a vast array of
issues relating to state and local governmental law. Matters involv-3
ing territorial jurisdiction, 2 environmental quality and control,
6
governmental liability 4 elections, 5 property rights and regulations,
and public finance 7 came before the judiciary for review. In response, the courts decided some new questions of law and more
sharply defined prior interpretations of state and local governmental law in Illinois.
II.

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

A. Detachment
Recent demographic trends have precipitated new concerns
about school districts and other local governmental units. Faced
with increased operating and labor costs as well as greater responsibility in providing services to their citizens, local governments
often have tried to expand their tax bases to cope with new financial strains. The competition for bigger and broader tax bases and
better services often underlies detachment and annexation disputes
between local governmental units."
For school districts, the battles to obtain or retain jurisdiction
over property are especially acute. The threat of detachment not
only endangers the property tax revenues for a school district, but
also may reduce the state aid payments that are based on enrollment figures. The loss of significant amounts of revenue necessarily leads to severe alteration or elimination of programs, which in
turn affects staffing needs and even the viability of a district. Consequently, on several occasions during the Survey period, courts
adjudicated detachment and annexation disputes involving school
and other local government districts.
In one case, Phillips v. Special Hearing Board,9 the petitioners
sought to detach their neighborhood from the Rockford school dis1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The Survey period covers decisions issued between July 1, 1986, and July 1, 1987.
See infra notes 8-39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-123 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 203-27 and accompanying text.
See generally Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 193-94 (N.D.

I1. 1986).
9. 154 Il. App. 3d 799, 504 N.E.2d 1251 (2d Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 115 Ill. 2d
550, 511 N.E.2d 436 (1987).
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trict and annex it to the Winnebago district.' 0 The hearing board
refused to grant their petition, and the circuit court reversed."I
Upon review, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
analyzed the petition and relied on statutory and case law definitions of proper detachment. These definitions focused on elements
such as the ability of either district to satisfy the state's minimum
standards of recognition, 12 the possibility of serious financial detriment to the district facing detachment, 3 the advantages that different districts could offer students, the relative distances of the
schools from the children's residences, the students' identification
with a particular neighborhood, the likelihood of participation in
extracurricular activities, and the convenience of the proposed
14
change to the parents and children.
After weighing the evidence regarding these elements, the appellate court determined that the residents of the territory at issue
could benefit equally in either the Rockford or the Winnebago district.1' In order to resolve the controversy between the districts,
the court looked next to the "will of the people," and found that
eighty percent of the residents in the territory favored detach10.

Phillips, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 504 N.E.2d at 1252.

11.

Id.

12. Id. at 805, 504 N.E.2d at 1255. The statutory standards of recognition do not
need to be satisfied in all detachment cases. See Davis v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 155 Il. App. 3d 185, 507 N.E.2d 1352 (5th Dist. 1987). In Davis, the court held that
because the current district was an "old type unit" as distinguished from a "community
unit" district, the loss in tax base caused by detachment would not place the district in
contravention of the minimum tax base recognition standard. This statutory standard
applied only to "community unit" districts undergoing detachment, which are required
to keep their tax base equal to such a minimal level as is required before new districts may
be created. Id. at 193, 507 N.E.2d at 1357.
13. 154 Il. App. 3d at 803, 504 N.E.2d at 1254-55. Courts look to the percentage of
the lost tax revenue over the district's total revenue to evaluate serious financial detriment. In Phillips, the loss of revenue to the district would be .13%, which the court
characterized as a "minimal amount." Id. at 803, 504 N.E.2d at 1254. In Davis, an even
larger percentage of .3% was held to be de minimis financial injury to the losing district,
and thus not sufficient to deny detachment. 155 11. App. 3d at 188-89, 507 N.E.2d at
1354.
A similar standard applies in detachment proceedings involving fire protection districts. If the financial effect of detachment would impair materially the ability of the
district to continue to provide fire protection, detachment would be precluded. See In re
Elk Grove Fire Protection Dist., 148 Ill. App. 3d 921, 500 N.E.2d 52 (1st Dist. 1986). In
denying the proposed detachment, the court in Elk Grove noted that "material impairment" is to be determined on a case-by-case basis with consideration of the specific facts
and circumstances, as opposed to a strict numerical standard. Id. at 927, 500 N.E.2d at
56.
14. Phillips, 154 Il1. App. 3d at 805, 504 N.E.2d at 1255.
15. Id. at 806, 504 N.E.2d at 1256.
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ment.I6 Because of the strong community preference for the detachment, the court honored the "will of the people" and allowed
the detachment.1 7 Thus, although courts previously have not emphasized the "will of the people" when evaluating petitions for detachment, the Phillips court demonstrates a trend towards
increasing reliance on the "will of the people" in deciding factually
ambiguous cases. "8
Although the courts have shown deference to the "will of the
people" when the majority is seeking school district detachment,
this deference does not translate into a relaxation of the procedural
and substantive requirements for territorial detachment. All procedures must be satisfied fully. 19 One of these requirements is that
the territory within a school district be contiguous.2 0 Although
this contiguity requirement clearly applies to school districts created under the Illinois School Code, 2 1 no statute imposes a similar
requirement on "special charter" school districts. During the Survey period, the question arose whether "special charter" districts
also must be and remain contiguous.
In Board of Education Rockford School District 205 v. Hearing
Board2 2 the court held that a petition for detachment from a special charter district will be denied when it would cause noncontiguity to the former district by creating "islands" wholly separate
from the district. 23 The court found the ability of the special charter district to provide services to the outlying islands would be
hampered severely if detachment were allowed. 24 The court there16. Id. at 806-07, 504 N.E,2d at 1252, 1256-57.
17. Id. at 807, 504 N.E.2d at 1257.

18. This focus on the "will of the people" seems to have played a significant role in
numerous detachment cases. In Davis, when detachment was granted, the residents favored the petition. 155 Ill. App. 3d at 188, 507 N.E.2d at 1354. On the other hand, in
Fixmer v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 146 Ill. App. 3d 660, 497 N.E.2d 152 (2d
Dist. 1986), in which detachment was denied, the "will of the people" opposed the action.
Id. at 665, 497 N.E.2d at 156. Thus, in the absence of clear evidence in support of or
against a detachment petition, the "will of the people" is indeed given considerable

weight by courts in their rulings.
19. Detachment will not be considered when all statutory petitioning requirements
are not met. In Betts v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 151 111. App. 3d 465, 502
N.E.2d 787 (2d Dist. 1987), the court strictly required fulfillment of all detachment peti-

tioning procedures, and found a lack of jurisdiction by the regional board over the matter
when such requirements were not met. Id. at 468-71, 502 N.E.2d at 790-91.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 7-4 (1985).
21. Id. at paras. 1-1 to 36-1.
22. 152 Ill. App. 3d 936, 505 N.E.2d 32 (2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 115 11. 2d
535, 511 N.E.2d 425 (1987).
23. 152 11. App. 3d at 940, 505 N.E.2d at 35.
24. Id.
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fore denied the proposed detachment and held that there was a
common law requirement of contiguity.25 In making this ruling,
the court distinguished the instant situation from dictum in earlier
cases that suggested contiguity is not necessary. 26 The court emphasized that the earlier cases involved irregularly shaped territories that shared boundaries with the school district, whereas the
situation at issue did not.27
During the Survey period, Illinois courts have made it clear that
a detachment cannot be allowed if it would disrupt the contiguity
of a territory within a school or other local district. In addition,
courts recognize this contiguity requirement in analyzing all detachment proposals, even if a previously uncontested detachment
already has created noncontiguity within the district or between
the districts.
B.

Annexation

The continuing demand for additional land development has expanded the boundaries of metropolitan communities further into
rural areas. This need for expansion often conflicts with the desire
to preserve the character of a rural area. Furthermore, this conflict
is complicated because municipalities must balance their tax bases
with their increasing obligations to provide services, necessitating
expansion in order to collect more income from annexed property
owners. Consequently, annexation disputes inevitably arise and
the courts must resolve them. Several annexation disputes were
adjudicated during the Survey period.
In a case of first impression, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
25. Id. at 939, 505 N.E.2d at 35.
26. Id.
27. Id. Although "compactness" of territory is a factor in detachment proceedings,
irregularity of shape or lack of compactness will not automatically bar a detachment. In
Davis, the court held that although detachment would create a "corridor" within the
former district, the detachment was nevertheless allowed because the district was already
irregular in shape and no part of the district would be isolated by the detachment so as to
create noncontiguity. 155 11. App. 3d at 192, 507 N.E.2d at 1357.
28. The validity of the noncontiguity defense to detachment despite a previous waiver
of such defense was upheld in Towanda Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Towi of
Normal, 154 I1. App. 3d 1, 506 N.E.2d 461 (4th Dist. 1987). In Towanda, a petition to
prevent automatic disconnection was granted when objectors asserted that the disconnection would create a lack of contiguity. Id. at 5, 506 N.E.2d at 463-64. The town argued
that a lack of contiguity already existed because of an earlier unprotested disconnection.
Thus, the town asserted that the objectors had waived this noncontiguity defense. Id. at
2-3, 506 N.E.2d at 462. The court held that each disconnection must be considered a
separate transaction. Therefore lack of contiguity can be raised again to bar the detachment despite prior waiver in another disconnection proceeding. Id. at 4, 506 N.E.2d at
463.
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Second District interpreted a statute allowing annexation of noncontiguous property when the only intervening property blocking
contiguity is forest preserve property.29 In People ex. rel. Ryan v.
Village of Bartlett,3 ° the plaintiffs sought to prevent an annexation
and argued that the use of the word "only" implies that only forest
preserve land may lie between any boundary of a village and the
property sought to be annexed. 3 ' In response, the village argued
that only one, not all, of the boundaries, must be separated by the
forest preserve to allow annexation.32 The court agreed with the
village's contention that only one boundary need be separated by
forest preserve property to satisfy the language of the statute, and
rejected the plaintiff's interpretation as an illogical reading of the
statute.3a
In reviewing petitions for annexation, Illinois courts have continued to require that all procedures be followed strictly. 34 Similarly, any efforts to prevent the annexation of property must be
based upon proper statutory authority. If a municipality attempts
to overstep this authority, its actions will not be upheld by the
court. This principle was enunciated in Village of Long Grove v.
Village of Kildeer.35 In that case, the named municipalities entered
into an agreement that purportedly prohibited either one from annexing land beyond a jurisdictional boundary line which they mutually established.36 When Kildeer decided to disregard the
37
agreement, Long Grove filed suit to enforce it.
The court refused
to uphold the agreement, ruling that the authority of the municipalities extended to only the setting of planning boundaries, and
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 7-1-1 (1985). The statute provides in relevant part
that "territory which is not contiguous to a municipality but is separated therefrom only
by a forest preserve district may be annexed to the municipality. . .
30. 151 Ill. App. 3d 533, 502 N.E.2d 443 (2d Dist. 1986).
31. Id. at 535, 502 N.E.2d at 445-46.
32. Id. at 535, 502 N.E.2d at 446.
33. Id. at 536, 502 N.E.2d at 446. The court observed that, if the plaintiff's interpretation was accepted, the unlikely result would be that annexation would be allowed only
when the entire annexed territory was surrounded by forest preserve, which in turn was
surrounded by the village. Id.
34. See In re Village of Wadsworth, 154 Ill. App. 3d 54, 506 N.E.2d 677 (2d Dist.
1987) (when petitioners failed to file a proper affidavit with their petition but subsequently filed such affidavit, their action was not barred because the statute required only
the submission of the affadavit prior to the hearing).
35. 146 Ill.
App. 3d 979, 497 N.E.2d 319 (2d Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill.
2d
586, 505 N.E.2d 363 (1986).
36. 146 Il. App. 3d at 980, 497 N.E.2d at 319.
37. Id. at 980, 497 N.E.2d at 319-20.
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not to the setting of annexation boundaries.3 In response to this
decision, however, the legislature amended the Illinois Municipal
Code to authorize annexation boundary agreements between
municipalities. 9
III.

POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Regulating potentially hazardous activities traditionally has
been a governmental function. As the adverse effects of pollutants
on the public health and the environment have become more obvious, however, the control of such pollutants has become more significant. The government has increasingly expanded its efforts to
eliminate hazardous or unhealthy pollution.4 During the Survey
year, Illinois courts decided several cases in which they faced the
challenge of balancing the sometimes contrary goals of protecting
the environment and promoting the economic viability of certain
technologies. In making such decisions, the courts often considered the extent to which the legislature has expressed its determination to enforce environmental protection measures.
In one such case, City of Lake Forest v. PCB,41 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District reviewed the authority of the
Illinois Pollution Control Board (the "PCB") to regulate municipalities in the exercise of their powers. In that case, Lake Forest
passed an ordinance that permitted leaf burning under specified
conditions. 42 The PCB subsequently issued a cease and desist order to the city, claiming that the ordinance violated the Environmental Protection Act (the "Act"). 43 The practical effect of the
44
PCB's order was to force Lake Forest to repeal its ordinance.
The court held that the PCB lacked the authority to proscribe the
Lake Forest ordinance, because the legislature did not intend to
delegate to the PCB the power to interfere in purely governmental
38. Id. at 981-82, 497 N.E.2d at 320-21; (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 para. 11-12-9
(1985)).
39. See P.A. 85-0854, 1987 11. Legis. Serv. 85-854 (West).
40. An example of the state's expanding interest in reducing pollution is evident in
the passage of Public Act 84-1445 by the legislature during the Survey year. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 7201-7206 (West Supp. 1987). Under this law, the State of
Illinois will indemnify from liability individuals engaged in certain "pollution response"
activities, in order to encourage participation in programs to clean up, treat, and reclaim
waste and other pollutants in the state.
41. 146 I1. App. 3d 848, 497 N.E.2d 181 (2d Dist. 1986).
42. Id. at 849-50, 497 N.E.2d at 182.
43. Id. at 850, 497 N.E.2d at 182. Specifically, the PCB alleged that Lake Forest
violated sections 9(a) and 9(c) of the Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 ./2, paras.
1009(a),(c) (1985).
44. City of Lake Forest, 146 Ill.
App. 3d at 853, 497 N.E.2d at 184-85.
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matters.45
In addition to issues concerning the scope of environmental
agency powers, courts also were faced with interpreting statutory
restrictions on the issuance of landfill expansion permits. In
MI.G. Investments, Inc. v. EPA, 46 owners of a landfill requested a
supplemental permit to increase the maximum elevation of its existing landfill site.4 The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(the "EPA") denied the permit, observing that local approval was
a prerequisite for a "new regional pollution control facility. ' 48
On appeal, the petitioners argued that the statute defining "new
regional pollution control facility" contemplated only lateral, not
vertical expansion. 49 Accordingly, they asserted that the proposed
vertical expansion would not expand the boundaries of the landfill
and, therefore, did not require local approval.5 0 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District agreed, stating that the statutory terms "area" and "boundary" refer only to lateral expansion,
and, according to the court, the local approval process did not apply to vertical expansions."
The M. G. decision should not be interpreted to disfavor all local input in environmental matters. Rather, it merely limits the
local authority to impose environmental controls to areas that traditionally are governed by localities or that are not inconsistent
with statutory enactments. 2
The courts occasionally allot considerable deference to local approval of landfills. In McHenry County Landfill, Inc. v. EPA, 5 a the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that a county
serving as the local siting authority may demand stricter precau45. Id. at 854, 497 N.E.2d at 184.
46. 151 Ill. App. 3d 488, 502 N.E.2d 1042 (2d Dist. 1986), appealallowed, 115 Il1. 2d
543, 511 N.E.2d 430 (1987).
47. 151 11. App. 3d at 489, 502 N.E.2d at 1043.
48. Id. at 490-91, 502 N.E.2d at 1043.
49. Id. at 493, 502 N.E.2d at 1045.
50. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003(x)(2) (1985)).
51. Id. at 493-95, 502 N.E.2d at 1045-47.
52. The regulation of pollutants by a county is allowed when it complements the state
scheme. In County of Cook v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 726, 504
N.E.2d 904 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 115 Ill.
2d 539, 511 N.E.2d 426 (1987), an
anti-odor ordinance was upheld when it was found not to be preempted by state legislation and consistent with the county's traditional role in regulating nuisances. Id. at 731,
504 N.E.2d at 907-08. But see Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Village of Wauconda, 117
Ill. 2d 107, 510 N.E.2d 858 (1987) (pesticide control ordinance by a local unit was preempted by a thorough federal and state scheme of regulation that left no room for further
local regulation.).
53. 154 Ill. App. 3d 89, 506 N.E.2d 372 (2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 115 Ill. 2d
543, 511 N.E.2d 430 (1987).
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tions and more advanced technologies in the development of a
landfill than those mandated by the EPA, provided that these local
standards are reasonable. 54 In addition, the court rejected the
landfill owners' procedural challenge to the county's denial of local
site approval by holding that the twenty-one-day pre-hearing notice for a local site hearing was not absolutely required or strictly
jurisdictional. 55 Accordingly, because there was no prejudice from
providing only twenty days' notice before the hearing, the hearing
was found to be valid. 56 Finally, the court found that the objectors
to the landfill lacked standing to participate in the appeal because
they were neither parties at the hearing, nor adversely affected by
the denial of local siting approval at such hearing."
In several other cases during the Survey period, courts continued to give greater definition to the authority and role of the PCB
in promulgating and enforcing environmental regulations. First,
the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the PCB's power to create
regulations for special classes of activities did not restrict its discretionary power to promulgate individual, site-specific standards."
In another case, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
required the PCB to adopt a "common sense" approach in enforcing its orders when immediate enforcement of existing regulations
would cause severe economic harm to a party who was awaiting
approval of less stringent regulations. 9 In yet another case, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District determined that
fines for pollution violations were a means of enforcement, rather
than penalties. Therefore, these fines should not be imposed in arbitrarily excessive amounts when the violator has acted in good
faith. 6°
54. 154 II. App. 3d at 100-01, 506 N.E.2d at 380-81.
55. Id. at 95-97, 506 N.E.2d at 377-78.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 94, 506 N.E.2d at 376.
58. The Supreme Court held, in Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. PCB, 116 I1. 2d
397, 507 N.E.2d 819 (1987), that the enactment by the legislature of section 28.1 of the
Environmental Protection Act did not restrict, eliminate, or abrogate the ability of the
agency to develop site-specific standards under section 27. Id. at 406, 507 N.E.2d at 82223. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1027, 1028.1 (1985). The new section 28.1
was seen as an additional tool for the PCB, not a rein on its other powers. Central
Illinois, 116 Il. 2d at 405, 507 N.E.2d at 822.
59. See Citizens Utilities Co. v. PCB, 152 Ill. App. 3d 122, 504 N.E.2d 224 (3d Dist.
1987) (petitioner was allowed to delay compliance with certain environmental standards
pending a re-e- ,aluation of such standards when the revised standard could save the petitioner millions of dollars).
60. In Archer Daniels Midland v. PCB, 149 Ill. App. 3d 301, 500 N.E.2d 580 (4th
Dist. 1986), a fine assessed by the PCB was rejected for being arbitrary and excessive. Id.
at 306, 500 N.E.2d at 583. The violator in that case had demonstrated good faith in

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

In addition to giving fuller definition to the authority and role of
the PCB, the courts also considered procedural matters concerning
the granting or denial of permits. First, one court made clear that
only by following proper procedures can a petitioner be heard on
appeal. Thus, petitioners wishing to appeal the denial of a permit
must first seek administrative review before the PCB and then may
appeal directly to the state appellate court. Review in the circuit
court is not an option.6 ' In another case, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the PCB was correct in conducting a hearing to
review the denial of a permit by the EPA; furthermore, the PCB's
reversal of the EPA's action was proper.62
In sum, the courts were especially mindful of clearly defining the
powers and roles of environmental agencies yet required petitioners
to adhere strictly to established procedures. In doing so, courts
have been sensitive to the need for applying and enforcing the standards of the Environmental Protection Act in a practical way.
Yet, practical convenience has not been used as an excuse for ignoring the provisions of the Act or for excusing duties established
on persons under common law.63

IV.

GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY

Despite twenty-three years since the enactment of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(the "Act"), claimants, local governments, and courts still struggle
to define its reaches.M During the Survey year, this struggle continued, both in terms of the procedural and substantive provisions
of the Act. The legislature revised the Act in order to mitigate the
effects that the "insurance crisis" may have on local governments. 65 This Survey section will review the efforts of the courts to
spending over $4.5 million to solve the discharge problems. Id. at 303, 500 N.E.2d at

582.
61. Inland Steel Mortgage Acceptance Corp. v. Carlson, 154 IIl. App. 3d 890, 895,
898, 507 N.E.2d 213, 216-17 (2d Dist. 1987).
62. EPA v. PCB, 115 III. 2d 65, 68-69, 503 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1986). In this case, the
Illinois Supreme Court also ruled that in this situation the PCB is not required to apply
the "manifest weight" test required for reviewing EPA orders under ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
111 1/2, para. 1039.2 (1985). Id. at 69-70, 503 N.E.2d at 345.
63. See, e.g., Village of Forrest v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 146 Ill. App. 3d 20, 29-30,
496 N.E.2d 257, 263 (4th Dist. 1986) (railroad was ordered to abate a nuisance it had

created by blocking off a drainage ditch that a village had used for many years to alleviate
flooding problems).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101 to 10-101 (1985).
65. These revisions are found in P.A. 84-1431, 1986 II1.Legis. Serv. 84-1431 (West),
effective Nov. 26, 1986 and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101.1 - 9-107 (West Supp.
1986).
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clarify the limits of governmental exposure to tort liability under
the Act.
A. Notice and Other Statutory Requirements
Section 8-102 of the Act required that a claimant against a governmental body serve written notice upon the body within one year
after the injury or cause of action.66 Failure to meet the deadline
precluded further action.67 Illinois courts interpreted this section
of the Act several times during the Survey period in deciding
whether sufficient notice had been served.
In Lane v. Chicago Housing Authority,68 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District held that a cause of action against the
Chicago Housing Authority (the "CHA") was barred when no
written notice was served upon the CHA within the one-year period.69 Because actual notice is required, mere filing of the complaint, as opposed to service, within the year was insufficient.7°
In Lane, the injury occurred on April 11, 1984, but no written
notice was served upon the CHA. 71 Although the claimant filed
his complaint on April 8, 1985, before the deadline expired, actual
service of the summons and complaint did not occur until after the
one-year period, on April 12.72 Thus, the failure to provide the
CHA with a timely notice of the claim or complaint barred the
claimant from seeking damages.73
Each element required by section 8-102 had to be included in the
statutory notice. 74 Therefore, in Grady v. Bi-State Development
Agency, 75 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District dis66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 8-102 (1985) (repealed 1986).
67. Id.
68. 147 III. App. 3d 876, 498 N.E.2d 604 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d
576, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1986).
69. 147 Il1.App. 3d at 880, 498 N.E.2d at 607.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 876, 880, 498 N.E.2d at 604, 606.
72. Id. at 876-77, 498 N.E.2d at 604.
73. Id. at 879-80, 498 N.E.2d at 607.

74. For example, the court found the notice insufficient in Carroll v. Chicago Housing Authority, 155 Ill. App. 3d 710, 508 N.E.2d 285 (1st Dist. 1987), when the plaintiff
specified neither the injury suffered nor the negligent act or omission by the CHA within
the statutory period. Id. at 713, 508 N.E.2d at 286. But see Whitney v. Chicago, 155 Ill.
App. 3d 714, 508 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1987), in which plaintiffs were allowed to amend
their erroneous original complaint after the deadline had passed, because the court held
that the notice requirement of the Act should be construed liberally. Id. at 717, 508
N.E.2d at 296. The holding further stated that the Act required the written notice merely
to set forth the general nature of the accident as opposed to the detailed information the
defendants sought to demand. Id.
75. 151 I1. App. 3d 748, 502 N.E.2d 1087 (5th Dist. 1986).
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missed a claim against a public agency because the notice lacked
information required by section 8-102.76 The claimant's address,
the approximate time of the accident, the general nature of the accident, and the name and address of any attending physician or
treating hospital were omitted." The claim was barred in order to
protect the local public entity from being misled by the incomplete
notice. 8
Although courts required substantial compliance with section 8102 of the Act, the notice requirements did not apply to some tort
actions against governmental bodies. The court considered such
an exception in Leckrone v. City of Salem.7 9 In Leckrone, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the notice section of the Act does not apply in an injunctive action against a
governmental entity because an injunction is a relief other than
damages.8 0 Additionally, the two-year statute of limitations in the
Act is not a bar against an injury that is ongoing; each recurring
event creates a new cause of action prompting the statutory period
to begin running anew.8
During the Survey period, the courts also examined other provisions of the Act that removed the protection of general immunity
for certain government torts. One of these torts, wrongful demolition, 82 was aat issue in Hapeniewski v. City of Chicago Heights.83 In
Hapeniewski, a building owner brought an action against the city
for wrongful demolition under section 1-4-7 of the Municipal
Code.814 The plaintiff argued that because section 2-101(e) precluded immunity from liability for wrongful demolition under the
Act, the two-year statute of limitations imposed by the Act should
not apply to such an action. 85 The court disagreed, observing that
section 2-101(e) affected the substantive provisions of the Act, but
76.

Id. at 751, 502 N.E.2d at 1089-90.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 751, 502 N.E.2d at 1090. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Welch criticized
the result and contended that the plaintiff had complied sufficiently with section 8-102 to
maintain her suit. Id. at 752-53, 502 N.E.2d at 1090-91 (Welch, J., dissenting).
79. 152 Ill. App. 3d 126, 503 N.E.2d 1093 (5th Dist. 1987).
80. Id. at 137, 503 N.E.2d at 1101.
81. Id. at 137-38, 503 N.E.2d at 1101.
82. See also Turpen v. City of St. Francisville, 145 Ill. App. 3d 891, 495 N.E.2d 1351
(5th Dist. 1986) (approval of the city council not necessary to hold city liable for wrongful demolition when mayor had authorized demolition in an emergency situation).
83. 147 Ill. App. 3d 528, 497 N.E.2d 97 (1st Dist. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, 108 S.
Ct. 53 (1987).
84. Id. at 529, 497 N.E.2d at 98 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 1-4-7 (1985)).
85. Id. at 530-31, 497 N.E.2d at 98-99 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2.101(e)

(1985)).
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not procedural matters such as the statute of limitations. 6 Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations applied, and the court dismissed the action for failure to comply with this procedural
8
requirement. 7
B. Governmental Duties and Liabilities
A threshold question that must be addressed before considering
the availability of immunity under the Act is whether a local governmental body had a duty that could give rise to tort liability.
The Illinois legislature already has established in section 4-102 of
the Act that municipalities do not have a duty to provide police
protection to their citizens or, when such protection is provided, to
meet any minimum level of service. 8 Likewise, pursuant to section 4-107 of the Act, a public employee is not liable for injuries
caused by failure to make an arrest or to retain a person in custody.89 The courts addressed these sections during the Survey year
and analyzed their possible conflict with section 2-202 of the Act,
which holds public entities and their employees liable for wilful
and wanton conduct in the enforcement of any law. 9°
In Luber v. City of Highland,9 1the plaintiff claimed that a police
officer, who had stopped an allegedly intoxicated traffic violator,
negligently allowed the violator to continue driving.92 The driver
subsequently was involved in an accident that caused serious injury
to the plaintiff.93 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the officer was not liable because his conduct did not
bring him within the traditionally applied special duty exception to
nonliability. 94 Moreover, because sections 4-102 and 4-107 applied
86. Id. at 531, 497 N.E.2d at 99.
87. Id. at 533, 497 N.E.2d at 101.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 4-102 (1985) (amended 1986). Additionally, government bodies are not liable for actions taken by off-duty employees in pursuit of personal goals. In Wolf v. Liberis, 153 Il1. App. 3d 488, 505 N.E.2d 1202 (1st Dist. 1987),
appeal denied, 115 Ill. 2d 552, 511 N.E.2d 438 (1987), the city was not liable for the
actions of an off-duty police officer who was not acting in an official capacity at the time
he was involved in a collision. Id. at 492-93, 505 N.E.2d at 1206.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 4-107 (1985).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-202 (1985) (amended 1986).
91, 151 Ill. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243 (5th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 Il1.2d
547, 508 N.E.2d 729.
92. Id. at 759-60, 502 N.E.2d at 1244-45.
93. Id. at 760, 502 N.E.2d at 1244.
94. Id. at 762, 502 N.E.2d at 1246. The special duty exception was rejected by the

courts in this context in Hernandez v. Village of Cicero, 151 Ill. App. 3d 170, 502 N.E.2d
1226 (1st Dist. 1986), and Mallder v. Rasmussen, 145 Il1.App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356
(3d Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 112 Ill. 2d 577, - N.E.2d _. The special duty exception
depends upon a factually sensitive four-part test that creates a duty upon police officers
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specifically to police activity, they were held to control over the
more general provisions of section 2-202 relating to wilful and
wanton conduct. 95 According to the Luber court, even if the officer's conduct had been wilful and wanton, no liability would result unless a plaintiff could establish that a special duty was owed
to him.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District reached a different interpretation of these provisions in Laco v. City of Chicago.96 In Laco, the court implied that police officers would lose
the protection of section 4-102 if their actions or omissions were
wilful or wanton under section 2-202. 97 The officers had been involved in an automobile pursuit and were judged not to have acted
wilfully or wantonly, and thus liability was not established.98 Nevertheless, the Laco decision indicates that if there had been wilful
or wanton conduct by the officers, section 2-202 would negate the
effects of sections 4-102 and 4-107. 99 In another case, involving the
application of section 2-102 of the Act, 10° the Illinois Supreme
Court interpreted section 2-102 literally and held that a transit district was completely immune from punitive damages. 101
C.

The Effect of Other Tort-Related Statutes
During the Survey period, Illinois courts also interpreted other
statutes that relate to a local government's liability for damages in
tort. In so doing, they reconciled apparently contradictory policies
of the state that are expressed in the Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act (the "Contribution Act") 0 2 on the one hand, and
the establishment of the Illinois Court of Claims on the other
only when each element of the test is found to be present. Luber, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 762,
502 N.E.2d at 1246.
95. Luber, 151 Il1.App. 3d at 763, 502 N.E.2d at 1246 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
85, paras. 4-102, 4-107 (1985) (amended 1986)).
96. 154 Ill. App. 3d 498, 507 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1987).

97.

Id. at 509, 507 N.E.2d at 70-71.

98.
99.

Id. at 504-05, 507 N.E.2d at 68.
The court did not decide this precise issue, which might explain its questionable

rationale. Under traditional tort law, no conduct, regardless of its nature or degree, can
create liability in the absence of a legal duty. Sections 4-102 and 4-107 are determinative
on the question of duty. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 4-102, 4-107 (1985) (amended
1986).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-102 (1985 & West Supp. 1986).
101. Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill. 2d 545, 499 N.E.2d 435
(1986). In this case, a public employee who was dismissed from her job filed an action for
retaliatory discharge, a remedy that included punitive damages. Id. at 547, 499 N.E.2d at
435. Even though punitive damages were an important element of this tort, the Act still
precluded their recovery. Id. at 553-54, 499 N.E.2d at 438.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301 to 305 (1985 & West Supp. 1986).
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The Contribution Act requires a party seeking contribution to
assert a counterclaim or third-party action at the time the action is
pending; otherwise the party forfeits any contribution claim.1°4
Consequently, an action brought against a unit of local government
in a circuit court of Illinois would prevent the locality from obtaining any contribution claim against the state as a joint
tortfeasor.1°1
The obvious inequity of this result caused the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Fifth District to create an exception to the Contribution Act in the case of Welch v. Stocks. 10 In Welch, county officials were sued in circuit court for negligence concerning a lack of
adequate traffic signs at a collision site. 10 7 These officials then filed
a third-party complaint against the state, which was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.108 The appellate court held that actions
against the state were an exception to the ban on separate actions
for contribution. Although local officials could not maintain their
third-party complaint in the circuit court, they successfully could
initiate a separate action for contribution against the state in the
Court of Claims."19
Another tort-related statute, the Road Construction Injuries Act
(the "RCIA")," 0 was interpreted and given further definition by
Illinois courts during the Survey period. The RCIA is a safety statute designed to protect workers and the public from injuries arising
from road construction on bridges and highways. Its applicability
to municipalities was considered for the first time by the courts in
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 801 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.8
(1985) (Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against the State).
Claims against employees of the state who are acting in their official capacities and state
agencies will be treated for purposes of the statute as actions against the state, and the
Court of Claims possesses exclusive jurisdiction of these claims. See Byron v. Village of
Lyons, 148 IlI. App. 3d 1057, 500 N.E.2d 499 (1st Dist. 1986) (action against Department of Children and Family Services), and Robb v. Sutton, 147 Il1. App. 3d 710, 498
N.E.2d 267 (4th Dist. 1986) (action against assistant dean of state university acting in
official capacity).
104. See Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill. 2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984).
105. See Byron, 148 I1. App. 3d 1057, 500 N.E.2d 499 (third-party contribution
claims against State dismissed because circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
106. 152 Il. App. 3d 1, 503 N.E.2d 1079 (5th Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 114 11. 2d
559, 508 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
107. 152 I1. App. 3d at 2, 503 N.E.2d at 1080.
108. Id. at 3, 503 N.E.2d at 1080.
109. Id. at 4-5, 503 N.E.2d at 1081.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, paras. 314.1 - 314.8 (1985),
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Thoman v. Village of Northbrook."' In Thoman, the plaintiff's automobile collided with the vehicle of a village employee making
road repairs.' 2 The motorist sued the employee and the village for
negligence and under the provisions of the RCIA.II3 The plaintiff
argued that the exemptions in section 8 of the RCIA applied only
to public employees, and not to the governmental entities that employ them.'" 4 The court disagreed, holding that section 8 should
be construed to apply to public agencies as well as their employees.II 5 The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind the
RCIA was to impose liability only on contractors,
subcontractors,
16
and their agents, not governmental bodies.
D. Additional Government Tort Issues
In addition to confronting issues regarding governmental liability under Illinois statutes, the courts addressed a variety of other
issues relating to governmental tort liability during the Survey period. First, courts reaffirmed that public entities owe no duty to
provide public access ways." 17 Second, the courts considered questions relating to governmental liability when insurance has been
purchased by a public entity. Municipalities must notify their insurance carriers in accordance with the terms of their insurance
contracts, just like any other insured.""
Although the purchase of insurance eliminates many of the protections against tort liability that a local government is given, it
does not increase the post-judgment interest rate that a public entity must pay. In a case of first impression, LaSalle NationalBank
111. 148 11. App. 3d 356, 499 N.E.2d 507 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 Il1.2d
585, 505 N.E.2d 363 (1987).
112. Id. at 357, 499 N.E.2d at 508.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 357-58, 499 N.E.2d at 508.
115. Id. at 358, 499 N.E.2d at 509. This holding was followed in Butts v. City of
Peoria, 152 Ill. App. 3d 382, 504 N.E.2d 544 (3d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 115 Il1. 2d
539, 511 N.E.2d 426 (1987) (action by motorcyclist against city under RCIA dismissed as
city exempt from this statute).
116. Thoman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 499 N.E.2d at 509.
117. See Frakes v. Martin, 151 Ill. App. 3d 676, 503 N.E.2d 556 (3d Dist. 1987),
appealdenied, 115 Ill. 2d 540, 511 N.E.2d 428 (1987); Nicholson v. City of Danville, 147
Ill. App. 3d 682, 498 N.E.2d 273 (4th Dist. 1986) (no duty to provide sidewalks). But see
Burris v. Madison County, 154 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 507 N.E.2d 1267 (5th Dist. 1987);
Highland v. Stevenson, 153 Ill. App. 3d 390, 505 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist. 1987) (duty to
maintain public ways).

118. See Village of Lake in the Hills v. Illinois Emcasco Ins. Co., 153 Ill. App. 3d
815, 506 N.E.2d 681 (2d Dist. 1987) (village must honor requirements of insurance contract to give written notice of claim to company and institute litigation within one year of

occurrence).
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v. City of Chicago,' '9 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District considered a successful plaintiff's request to obtain post-judgment interest at a rate of nine percent rather than the usual six
percent-rate assessable against government bodies. 20 The plaintiffs
argued that because the city was insured, the private insurance
company will be paying the interest, and thus the higher rate assessed against private parties should apply.' 2' The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that if the insurance company were
forced to pay higher interest, it would react by raising the city's
premiums, which would deplete the public coffers. 2 2 The legislature established the lower interest rate to preserve government
funds; the plaintiff's proposed alternative therefore could not
be
23
allowed because it would indirectly deplete public resources.

V.

ELECTION LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS

A. Election Law
During the Survey year, a number of issues arose concerning the
election process. These issues covered a wide range of topics, including nomination, campaigning, and the wording of the ballot
itself. In each of these cases, the courts demanded that statutory
24
procedures be followed strictly.
In In re Village of Maywood, 25 a petition to change the form of
government in that village was rejected for failure to include all the
information required by statute.' 26 The petitioners sought to
change the form of government from the managerial form to the
"strong mayor" type. 27 Although the petition asked whether the
form of government should be changed to this new form, it did not
provide for an abandonment of the old form as was required by
119. 154 111. App. 3d 456, 506 N.E.2d 1326 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 116 1U. 2d
560, 515 N.E.2d 110 (1987).
120. Id. at 461, 506 N.E.2d at 1329.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 468, 506 N.E.2d at 1334.
123. Id.
124. An example of the courts' strict demands for proper procedure is found in In re
Petition to Call an Election, 148 Il. App. 3d 436, 499 N.E.2d 129 (2d Dist. 1986). In that
case, the court ruled that before any further proceedings could be held on a petition to
incorporate a village, the county board must make certain determinations as was required
by the county's own resolution governing incorporation elections. Id. at 438, 499 N.E.2d
at 131.
125. 154 I1. App. 3d 754, 507 N.E.2d 151 (1st Dist. 1987).
126. Id. at 760, 507 N.E.2d at 155.
127. Id. at 755, 507 N.E.2d at 152.
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statute.1 28 The court ruled that, although the question of abandonment need not appear on the same ballot as the question to adopt
mayor" form, it must nevertheless be submitted to the
the "strong
29
citizens.

Courts have also required objectors to follow the statutory procedure in an equally rigorous manner. In Keating v. Iozzo, 30 a case
of first impression in Illinois, the court held that an objector would
not receive a deadline extension to file his objections.' 3 ' The village
clerk notified the objector that she would be in her office for only
approximately ninety minutes on the last day for filing objections. 32 Because the objector had received notice of this fact and
no evidence suggested a lack of opportunity to file before the deadline, an extension of the deadline was denied.' 33
Strict compliance with statutory procedures similarly is required
when the actual question presented on the ballot is at issue. In
Lipinski v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners,134 the petitioners sought to include a referendum for a nonpartisan election
on an upcoming ballot. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
referendum as being too vague and ambiguous. 36 The court ruled
that a binding referendum must be complete on its face and selfexecuting, leaving no unaddressed matters for the legislature to resolve in order to function. 37 In contrast, when the statute itself
petitioners are not
specifies that it should be construed liberally,
38
required to adhere as closely to procedure.
128. Id. at 759, 507 N.E.2d at 154; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 5-5-1 (1985).
129. 154 Ill. App. 3d at 760, 507 N.E.2d at 155.
130. 155 Il1. App. 3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503 (2d Dist. 1987).
131. Id. at 777, 781, 508 N.E.2d at 505, 508.
132. Id. at 775, 508 N.E.2d at 504.
133. Id. at 778.79, 781, 508 N.E.2d at 506-08.
134. 114 Ill. 2d 95, 500 N.E.2d 39 (1986).
135. Id. at 97, 500 N.E.2d at 40.
136. Id. at 100, 500 N.A.2d at 43. The referendum read:
Shall the mayor, the treasurer, and the clerk of the City of Chicago be elected
on a non-partisan ballot, by at least a 50% majority vote, but if no candidate
receives at least 50% of the votes cast for the respective office, then in a run-off
election between the two candidates for the office who received the greatest
number of votes for that office at the initial election?
The court noted that among other deficiencies, the proposed referendum did not specify to what election it would first apply, and was ambiguous on its face by including the
oxymoron "50% majority vote." Id. at 100, 103, 500 N.E.2d at 42-43.
137. Id. at 99-100, 500 N.E.2d at 41-42.
138. The Illinois Liquor Control Act (the "Liquor Act"), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43,
paras. 93.9 - 195 (1985), specifically paragraph 169, was interpreted in this regard in
Quarles v. Kozubowski, 154 Il. App. 3d 325, 507 N.E.2d 103 (1st Dist. 1987). In
Quarles, local residents wished to vote their precinct "dry," banning the retail sale of
liquor. Id. at 328, 507 N.E.2d at 105. Although their petition was deficient in some
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The courts also have determined that they will not penalize proponents of a referendum for using specific statutory wording on the
ballot, even though the language itself did not fully explain the
question presented to voters. In Lunde v. Rockford Public Library
Board, 39 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District allowed the Rockford Public Library Board (the "board") to use
funds raised for "maintenance and operation" of the library for
structural changes and remodeling of the building.140 Even though
these repairs were not strictly maintenance and operation, the exact wording of the referendum to increase library taxes was mandated by state law, and the board could not have clarified the ways
it intended to spend the revenue even if it so desired.14' Therefore,
the board did not suffer for faithfully adhering to statutory

constraints. 142
B. Public Officials
During the Survey period, the courts also addressed several issues concerning the authority and obligations of public officials.
The question of internal procedure in the actions of a city council
arose in Rod v. Washington. 43 In Roti, the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District held. that a simple majority of fifty-one
percent of the city council possessed sufficient legislative power to
repeal an earlier amendment requiring a supermajority two-thirds
vote to remove committee chairmen.'" Because this issue had not
been addressed previously in Illinois, the court followed similar
cases in other jurisdictions and held that "the power to make carries with it the right and power to unmake."'' 45 The court stressed
also that state law supersedes local law, and thus the mayor possesses the power to break a tie vote. 146
Furthermore, a potential appointee to public office cannot claim
such position unless the proper nominating procedure is followed.
respects, the court held that because that Liquor Act itself provides that its requirements
should be construed liberally, the absence of this information was not fatal to the petition.
Id. at 332-33, 507 N.E.2d at 107-08 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, para. 94 (1985)).
139. 153 Ill. App. 3d 803, 506 N.E.2d 385 (2d Dist. 1987).
140. Id. at 809-10, 506 N.E.2d at 389.
141. Id. at 807-08, 506 N.E.2d at 388.
142. Id. at 808, 506 N.E.2d at 389.
143. 148 11. App. 3d 1006, 500 N.E.2d 463 (ist Dist. 1986).
144. Id. at 1012, 500 N.E.2d at 468.
145. Id. at 1012, 500 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting State ex. rel. Kiel v.Riechmann, 239
Mo. 81, 142 S.W. 304 (1911)).
146. Id. at 1013, 500 N.E.2d at 468.
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In Spicer v. City of Chicago,147 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District held that when the mayor had withdrawn his nomination of a candidate for purchasing agent, the subsequent approval of that nominee by the city council was a nullity.' 4 The
mayor's withdrawal of his nominee terminated further action on
the matter. 149 Of course, even when public officials are elected
properly or appointed to office, other limitations may affect their
ability to hold such office.' 5 '
The rights of parties and candidates to choose the best manner
by which to nominate and campaign, without infringing on statutory and other restrictions, were also considered by the courts in
several cases decided during the Survey period. In People v.
White, 5 ' the Illinois Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional on its face a statute that required the names and addresses of
all publishers and circulators of political pamphlets to be printed
on those pamphlets. 52 In White, the defendant distributed a pamphlet calling for the removal from office of the incumbent, and his
replacement with another. 53 The flyer did not include the defendant's name and address in violation of a statute that made the
anonymous printing and circulation of such pamphlets a misdemeanor. 54 The Illinois Supreme Court found that this restriction
violated the first amendment, especially in light of the historical
importance of anonymous political speech, the lack of a compelling
state interest for the restriction, and the reduction of information
to the citizenry that would result if the statute were upheld. 55
Another statutory restriction on campaigning was intepreted
147.
148.
149.

149 Ill. App. 3d 68, 500 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1986).
Id. at 71, 500 N.E.2d at 635.
Id.

150.

For example, an official holding two or more incompatible offices must relin-

quish such positions in order to eliminate the incompatibility. See Teros v. Verbeck, 155
Ill. App. 3d 81, 506 N.E.2d 464 (3d Dist. 1987), dismissed, 115 Ill. 2d 550, 511 N.E.2d
436 (1987) (defendant not allowed to occupy position on County Board while serving as
deputy county coroner, because he could influence the budget and salaries of the coroner's office). Similarly, a potential public official may be prevented from taking office
because of the terms of a binding agreement. See Dineen v. City of Chicago, 152 Il. App.
3d 90, 504 N.E.2d 144 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal allowed, 115 Ill. 2d 540, 511 N.E.2d 427
(1987) (provision of collective bargaining agreement between city and police union requiring officers take unpaid leave of absence while running for office upheld).
151. 116 111. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987).
152. Id. at 183, 506 N.E.2d at 1290.
153. Id. at 172-73, 506 N.E.2d at 1285.
154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 29-14 (1985). See also White, 116 Il1.2d at 17374, 506 N.E.2d at 1285.
155. White, 116 Ill. 2d at 176-77, 179-80, 183, 506 N.E.2d at 1286, 1288, 1290.
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and clarified in McGuire v. Nogaj.' 6 In McGuire, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that section 10-4 of the
Election Code' 7 does not bar a person from circulating nominating petitions for more than one candidate for the same office when
the candidates are both independents.' 58 The statute forbids only
such dual circulation when one of the candidates for office is a
member of a political party."5 9 Thus, a circulator may carry petitions for two independent candidates for the same office.
Finally, the authority of a political party's central committee to
delegate to a special committee its powers to fill nomination vacancies was upheld in Allen v. ElectoralBoard of Saint Clair County."w
The court held that the central committee may remove voting authority from its membership and place
that authority in a smaller
6
group under proper circumstances.' '
VI.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS

A. Land Use and Zoning
During the Survey period, Illinois courts continued to define the
zoning powers of local governments. The courts have confirmed
that local zoning decisions are presumed valid unless they bear no
substantial relationship to the goal of promoting public health,
safety, and welfare.162 The presumption disappears when there is
no substantial relationship between the restriction imposed and the
purported purpose of the restriction. In City of Chicago v.
Gordon,' 6 a city ordinance banning the display of certain types of
outdoor advertising in residential neighborhoods was held unconstitutional. 164 The defendants, real estate agents and brokers, had
been issued citations for erecting "for sale" and "open house" signs
156.

146 Il. App. 3d 280, 496 N.E.2d 1037 (1st Dist. 1986).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-4 (1985).
158. McGuire, 146 IIl. App. 3d at 283, 496 N.E.2d at 1040.
159. Id. at 283, 496 N.E.2d at 1039-40.
160. 147 Ill. App. 3d 782, 498 N.E.2d 878 (5th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d
571, 505 N.E.2d 350 (1987).
161. Id. at 785-86, 498 N.E.2d at 880. Of particular interest, the court held that the
weighted voting mandated by statute was not effected, as the vote had been unanimous.
Id. at 786, 498 N.E.2d at 880.
162. See Knor v. County of Madison, 151 Ill. App. 3d 767, 502 N.E.2d 1063 (5th
Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987) (special use permit for
a gun club found valid); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of Bloomingdale, 154 Ill. App. 3d
918, 507 N.E.2d 517 (2d Dist. 1987) (denial of commercial development in residential
area proper); York v. Village of Wilmette, 148 Ill. App. 3d 108, 498 N.E.2d 712 (1st Dist.
1986) (special use permit for home for the elderly upheld).
163. 146 Ill. App. 3d 898, 497 N.E.2d 442 (ist Dist. 1986).
164. Id. at 905, 497 N.E.2d at 447.
157.
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in these areas. 65 The city claimed that the purpose of the ordinance was to prevent distractions which might impair traffic safety,
166
as well as to enhance the aesthetic quality of residential areas.
Because the city permitted many other distractions to continue, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District saw no direct relationship between the ordinance and its nominal aims. 167 The court
surmised that the real goal of the ordinance was to avoid panic
selling and "white flight."' 168 Finding no substantial relationship
between the ordinance and a legitimate
governmental goal, the
169
court declared the ordinance invalid.
A reasonable relation between the action taken and the legitimate goal sought is not the only requirement for a valid zoning
ordinance. In Zebulon Enterprises v. County of DuPage,170 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that a special use
ordinance also must contain sufficiently narrow, objective, and definite standards in order to avoid arbitrary denials of special use
permits.'71 In Zebulon, the plaintiff owned an adult book store and
operated "mini-theaters" on the premises. 172 The "mini-theaters"
constituted amusements requiring a special use permit under the
ordinance. 173 After reviewing the ordinance, the court found that
it lacked sufficient standards for evaluating an application for a
special use permit and, therefore, left open the possibility of discrimination by selective enforcement. 174 Although the ordinance
had been found valid when applied to the regulation of economic
interests, it left too much discretion in the hands of local authorities when first amendment interests were at stake. 175 Accordingly,
the ordinance was declared unconstitutional as it applied to plaintiff's "mini-theaters."' 176 Even when the first amendment is not involved, however, an ordinance must be sufficiently clear for an
1 77
ordinary person to understand its meaning.
165. Id. at 900, 497 N.E.2d at 444.
166. Id. at 903, 497 N.E.2d at 445-46.
167. Id. at 903-04, 497 N.E.2d at 446-47.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 905, 497 N.E.2d at 447.
170. 146 Il1. App. 3d 515, 496 N.E.2d 1256 (2d Dist. 1986).
171. Id. at 522-23, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
172. Id. at 517-18, 496 N.E.2d at 1257-58.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 522, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
175. Id. at 523, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
176. Id.
177. See also Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Joliet v. New Lenox, 152 111. App. 3d
919, 505 N.E.2d 1 (3d Dist. 1987) (special use permit ordinance found unconstitutional
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B.

Privileges

Although the courts are careful to prevent unfettered local discretion in regulating first amendment rights through land use restrictions, the judiciary nevertheless recognized a need for some
discretion even when the first amendment may be implicated. In
Foster & Kleiser v. City of Chicago,' a city landmark ordinance
prohibited the issuance of any permit to erect signs adjacent to an
official landmark.' 79 The plaintiffs erected signs on public property
pursuant to permits that were erroneously issued in violation of the
landmark ordinance. 80 The court upheld the constitutionality of
the ordinance, finding that it was content-neutral and that its standards of prohibiting signs "immediately adjacent" to designated
landmarks was closely related to the legitimate governmental goal
of historic preservation.'' Moreover, the plaintiffs obtained no
vested rights from the erroneously issued permits, 8 2 especially because permits to use public property are in the nature of a privilege
and are not entitled to due process protections.8 3 Finally, the court
held that the plaintiffs could not recover damages against the city
even if they had a vested right, because the city was immune from
84
liability under section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Act.
C. Statutory and JurisdictionalZoning Restrictions
During the Survey period, Illinois courts also have reviewed
cases involving standing to bring zoning challenges, the ability to
enforce existing ordinances, and the jurisdictional reaches of land
use regulations. The issue of standing was addressed in Tiskilwa
for vagueness because ordinary person could not guess whether an asphalt plant would
qualify as a permitted, special, or prohibited use under this ordinance).
178. 146 111. App. 3d 928, 497 N.E.2d 459 (1st Dist. 1986), appealdenied, 113 Ill. 2d
559 (1986).
179. Id. at 931, 497 N.E.2d at 462.
180. Id. at 930, 497 N.E.2d at 462. Rights of private persons to use public property
have been limited in other cases decided during the Survey year. In Hawthorne Bank of
Wheaton v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 154 I11.App. 3d 661, 506 N.E.2d 988 (2d Dist. 1987),
the court held that plaintiffs' erection of a canopy on a public right-of-way conferred on
them no ascertainable right that could limit the city's use of that property. Id. at 667,
506 N.E.2d at 993.
181. Foster & Kleiser, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 932, 934, 497 N.E.2d at 463-64.
182. Id. at 934-35, 497 N.E.2d at 464.
183. Id. See also Two Kats, Inc. v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 147 Ill. App. 3d 440,
497 N.E.2d 1314 (1st Dist. 1986) (liquor license is a privilege, not a vested right, and as
such is not entitled to due process consideration).
184. Foster & Kleiser, 146 I1l. App. 3d at 932, 497 N.E.2d at 462-63. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-104 (1985).
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Economic Development Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals.18 5
In Tiskilwa, the zoning board was denied standing when it sought
to appeal the validity of its own earlier order. 8 6 The board believed it had erred previously in granting a variance without proper
notification to surrounding property owners, as required by ordinance. 8 7 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held
that only parties involved in the variance proceeding, not the administrative agency which conducted it, have standing to appeal
the decision. 8 8 Hence, the board could not bring an independent
challenge.
An attempt to enforce a permit requirement for home occupations was reviewed in City of Pekin v. Kaminski. 8 9 In Kaminski,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District found that the
defendant, an insurance salesman, did not violate the zoning ordinance by failing to obtain a permit for a home occupation.'190 The
court held that the defendant's listing of his home phone in the
telephone directory and one isolated business transaction at his
house did not constitute a home occupation under the
ordinance. 191
The extent of a municipality's jurisdiction to regulate matters of
92
public health was tested in People ex. rel. Kempiners v. Draper.
In Draper, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a mobile home
park located outside of the boundaries of the City of Carbondale
could be within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the city to enforce health and quarantine ordinances, but only if the city had
93
expressed its intent to exercise such extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Thus, because the city had not done so, state health and safety
1 94
regulations governed the development and use of the park.
D.

Condemnation

During the Survey period, several courts considered the government's power to condemn private property for public use.
Although courts have allowed condemnation after a prima facie
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

148 I11. App. 3d 884, 500 N.E.2d 66 (3d Dist. 1986).
Id. at 887, 500 N.E.2d at 68.
Id. at 885, 500 N.E. 2d at 67.
Id. at 886-87, 500 N.E.2d at 68.
155 IM.App. 3d 826, 508 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist. 1987).
Id. at 831, 508 N.E.2d at 779.
Id. at 830-31, 508 N.E.2d at 779.
113 11. 2d 318, 497 N.E.2d 1166 (1986).
Id. at 321-22, 497 N.E.2d at 1168.
Id. at 322-23, 497 N.E.2d at 1168.
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need for the land has been demonstrated,' 95 and upon a payment of
adequate compensation,' 96 courts have not allowed condemnation
when the government agency possesses no statutory authority to
condemn specific parcels. In Town of Libertyville v. Bank of
Waukegan,' 97 condemnation of a conservation easement by a town
was not permitted. 9 8 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District held that under the Township Open Space Act (the
"Act"), 99 the "farm use" exemption protected this land from condemnation, because it was used for agricultural purposes. 200 The
fact that the town was attempting only to condemn a less than fee
simple interest (the conservation easement) did not limit the applicability of the Act. 20 1 The court reiterated the notion that eminent
domain statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the property
20 2
owner, and therefore denied the condemnation attempt.
VII.
A.

PUBLIC FINANCE

Accounting of Funds

During the Survey period, Illinois courts faced several issues relating to public finance and the management and accounting of
public funds. In Ryan v. City of Chicago,2 °3 the city had been depositing pension tax fund receipts into its Aggregate Funds Account before transferring such receipts to the Pension Fund and
retaining the interest derived from this money during the interim. 20 4 Following a challenge to the city's accounting practices,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that the city
must turn over all interest accrued from the pension tax fund receipts to the Pension Fund, 20 5 and the order was applied retroactively as well as prospectively. 206 This order reversed the ruling of
195. See Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. First Nat'l Bank of Waukegan, 154 Il1.
App. 3d 45, 506 N.E.2d 424 (2d Dist. 1987) (condemnation was allowed when the district
had proved a prima facie need for the subject property).
196. See Dept. of Transp. v. Birger, 155 Il1. App. 3d 130, 507 N.E.2d 1321 (5th Dist.
1987) (adequate compensation may be computed for condemned property by comparison
of sales prices of similar nearby property as proof of the value).
197. 152 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 504 N.E.2d 1305 (2d Dist. 1987).
198. Id. at 1071, 1073, 504 N.E.2d at 1307-08.
199. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, paras. 321-325 (1985 & West Supp. 1986).
200. Town of Libertyville, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1070-71, 504 N.E.2d at 1308.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1070-73, 504 N.E.2d at 1308-10.
203. 148 Il. App. 3d 638, 499 N.E.2d 517 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 111. 2d
585, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987).
204. Id. at 640, 499 N.E.2d at 518.
205. Id. at 643, 499 N.E.2d at 520.
206. Id. at 645, 499 N.E.2d at 521.
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the trial court, which had allowed the city to retain up to thirty
days of interest earned from these funds while deposited in the general fund.20 7 In another case, Richter v. Collinsville Township,2 °8
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that when
taxpayers voted in a town meeting to transfer surplus revenue from
a general fund to a special fund, proper accounting procedure required the inclusion of future tax receipts in computing the amount
of surplus revenue that could be transferred to the special fund,
because future expenses also were being computed. 219
B. Allocation of Funds
Illinois courts were also called upon to review a challenge by a
county department head to the amount of funds allocated to his
department by the county board. In McDonald v. County Board of
Kendall County,210 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that the county sheriff was not entitled to declaratory
relief concerning the rights of his department to county funds designated as "investigation" funds. 21 ' The sheriff was unable to show
a failure by the county board to supply his office with necessary
funds.212 He was also unable to prove his claim that an unauthorized police force was created in the state's attorney's office. 2 The
court held that all monies earmarked for "investigation" need not
be given to the sheriff's department because investigatory responsibilities are not the exclusive jurisdiction of any one county
officer.214

C. Taxation and Revenue
In several different cases decided during the Survey year, citizens
raised challenges to the governmental authority to impose certain
taxes. In ChicagoHealth Clubs, Inc. v. Picur,21 5 the Illinois Appel-

late Court for the First District held that the extension of the city
207. Id. at 644, 499 N.E.2d at 521.
208. 152 I1. App. 3d 10, 503 N.E.2d 1175 (5th Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 115 I1. 2d
550, 511 N.E.2d 437 (1987).
209. See Richter, 152 Ill. App. 3d 10, 503 N.E.2d 1175 (inclusion of future tax receipts proper in estimating tax surplus available for township road and bridge fund when
future expenses already had been taken into account).
210. 146 111. App. 3d 1051, 497 N.E.2d 509 (2d Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 111. 2d
576, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1987).
211. Id. at 1056-57, 497 N.E.2d at 513.
212. Id. at 1056, 497 N.E.2d at 513.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1055, 497 N.E.2d at 512.
215. 155 Il1. App. 3d 482, 508 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1987).
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amusement tax to cover health and fitness clubs and related activities was constitutional.2 16 The court rejected arguments by the
plaintiffs
that the tax was overbroad, vague, or without authority. 217 Other contentions that the tax violated equal protection
rights and was an impermissible extraterritorial tax were also
rejected.218
A similar result was reached in Forsbergv. City of Chicago.2 19 In
Forsberg,the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District upheld
the constitutionality of a city mooring tax despite numerous objections. 220 The court found that the ordinance was within the power
of the home rule unit, not unconstitutionally vague, and consistent
with due process requirements.22' Objections to the tax for its interference with interstate commerce and being void as an occupational tax also were rejected.222
Double taxation was alleged in Hammerman v. Illinois State
Toll Highway Authority.223 The plaintiffs in Hammerman brought
an action against the Tollway Authority claiming that the Motor
Fuel Tax Law,224 which was enacted for repair and maintenance
of highways, constituted double taxation with respect to roads
where tolls already were collected for that purpose. 22 The court
held that there was no double taxation, because tollway usage is a
matter of personal choice.226 Additionally, the complaint failed to
state a cause of action against the Tollway Authority, which has no
role in the imposition or collection of motor fuel taxes.227
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, Illinois courts have examined a wide
range of issues affecting the relationship between state and local
governments and their citizens. In so doing, the courts have interpreted many statutes that define the roles and authority of, as well
as limitations upon, public bodies. It is through this process that
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 495, 508 N.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 491-93, 508 N.E.2d at 748-49.
Id. at 492-95, 508 N.E.2d at 750.
151 IlI. App. 3d 354, 502 N.E.2d 283 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d

545, 508 N.E.2d 727 (1987).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

151 11. App. 3d at 373, 502 N.E.2d at 298.
Id. at 361-63, 502 N.E.2d at 290-92.
Id. at 366, 368, 502 N.E.2d at 293-95.
148 Ill. App. 3d 259, 498 N.E.2d 795 (1st Dist. 1986).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 417 - 434(a) (1985).
Hammerman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 498 N.E.2d at 797.
Id. at 266, 498 N.E.2d at 800.
Id. at 266, 498 N.E.2d at 801.
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the courts fulfill their central role of balancing the rights of the
individual with the rights of the people as expressed, through the
state and local governments.

